We present an automatic method for the synthesis of certificates for components in embedded real-time systems. A certificate is a small homomorphic abstraction that can transparently replace the component during model checking: if the verification with the certificate succeeds, then the component is guaranteed to be correct; if the verification with the certificate fails, then the component itself must be erroneous. We give a direct construction, based on a forward and backward reachability analysis of the timed system, and an iterative refinement process, which produces a series of successively smaller certificates. In our experiments, model checking the certificate is several orders of magnitude faster than model checking the original system.
Introduction
Model checking allows the developer of an embedded real-time system to detect inconsistent timing requirements and functional errors early in the design process. If the system contains an error, tools like UPPAAL [18] provide evidence in the form of an error trace, which can be used to reproduce the problem during simulation. If the system is correct, however, most model checkers only report the fact, without providing evidence that would help the designer understand why the system is correct, or help an independent verifier reproduce the proof.
In this paper, we present an automatic abstraction technique which provides such evidence. For a given component in a network of timed automata, we compute a quotient automaton, which we call the component's certificate. The certificate satisfies three key properties. First, it is sound to replace the component * This work was partly supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG) as part of the Transregional Collaborative Research Center "Automatic Verification and Analysis of Complex Systems" (SFB/TR 14 AVACS).
with its certificate during the verification of the network. We guarantee both that if the verification with the certificate succeeds, then the component itself is correct, and that if the verification with the certificate fails, then the component itself is erroneous. Second, it is easy to verify the validity of the certificate: The certificate is a simple homomorphic abstraction of the component, which means that each location of the certificate represents a set of locations in the component. Hence, verifying that the component is an accurate implementation of the certificate amounts to a simple (syntactic) simulation check. Third, the certificate is much smaller than the component. Since certificates only need to preserve those component properties that are actually necessary to establish the correctness of the full network, they can be based on a coarse equivalence relation. The resulting quotients are small, as illustrated by the following example. Figure 1 shows a network of timed automata modeling a simple production plant with two controllers. The plant processes workpieces at a rate of up to 0.5 pieces per second. When a workpiece enters the plant, both controllers are notified with the start signal. Then, the machine controlled by the first controller works on the piece (work 1 ) and finishes within two seconds. Once the first machine is done (finish 1 ), the machine controlled by the second controller works on the piece (work 2 ) and finishes (finish 2 ) again within at most two seconds. Afterwards, the controllers may be reset (reset) to be ready for the next workpiece. The actions abort 1 and abort 2 model a situation where the respective machine has not started working after one second, in which case the controllers can abort. We are interested in the property that the work on each workpiece is done (if completed) in at most four seconds. Figure 2 shows the certificate for controller #2. Locations e, f, i and locations g, h have been merged into single locations. Clearly, this abstraction extends the observable behavior of controller #2: for example, the controller now accepts an arbitrary number of start signals. However, the certificate is sound for proving that Network of timed automata modeling a simple production plant with two controllers. The following self loops are implicit: work 2 , finish 2 and abort 2 on all locations of Controller #1; work 1 , finish 1 and abort 1 on all locations of Controller #2; work 1 , work 2 , abort 1 and abort 2 on all locations of the property automaton.
the work on each piece is done within four seconds, because the relevant requirement for controller #2, that its work is finished within two seconds after receiving the finish 1 signal, is preserved. Our construction of the certificate is based on two equivalence relations over the locations of a given automaton within a network of timed automata. As explained in Section 4, two locations m 1 and m 2 are forward-equivalent if the sets of states that can be reached at m 1 and at m 2 are the same; dually, m 1 and m 2 are backward-equivalent if the sets of states that, starting at m 1 and at m 2 , can reach the error are the same. In the example, locations g and h of controller #2 are forward-equivalent because they are There are implicit self loops for work 1 , finish 1 and abort 1 on all locations.
both reachable in conjunction with locations d and k and clock values x, y, z ∈ R ≥0 . Locations e, f, and i are backward-equivalent: the error location π is unreachable from all these locations. The forward and backward equivalences can be computed directly, by computing the sets of forward and backward reachable states in the network. In Section 6 we additionally show that it is possible to construct the equivalence in an iterative fashion, where, starting with a complete partition of the location set, successively more and more locations are merged. This approach has the advantage that it is possible to interrupt the process as soon as the certificate has become sufficiently small.
In Section 7, we present experimental results that indicate that model checking the certificate is significantly faster (in our experiments, by several orders of magnitude) than model checking the original system. Related Work. The term certifying model checkers was coined by Namjoshi [20] in the setting of µ-calculus model checking for labeled finite-state transition systems. Different from our component-based setting, a certificate in [20] is a deductive proof of a global property, which is checked by inductive, rather than fixpoint-based methods.
Certificate synthesis reduces the size of a timed automaton by merging locations.
This approach can be compared to reduction techniques that merge states. Typically, some initial partition of the state space is split until the coarsest stable refinement is reached [2, 21, 11] , or states are collapsed based on some equivalence such as history equivalence or transition bisimulation [15] . An early proposal for an equivalence that is parameterized with information about the context of a process is context dependent process equivalence [19] .
State minimization techniques are useful to obtain a compact finite representation of the infinite state space of a timed automaton. As systems with dense time have an uncountable state space, all model checking algorithms build on abstraction (and hence on state minimization). The most widespread approach is to use approximate [5] or precise [18, 9] abstractions of the finite region graph [3] of timed automata. A common problem with these abstraction methods is, however, that they are not compositional and therefore cannot be applied to individual automata in a network of timed automata. Other reduction techniques, which can potentially be combined with state minimization, include partial order reduction (based on a local-time semantics) [7] and clock elimination [10] .
Algorithms similar to certificate synthesis are studied in the setting of compositional model checking. To prove a property P for the parallel composition M N of two timed automata M and N , the compositional model checker CMC [16, 17] first transforms the property with respect to N into P/N , and then, after simplification, further into P/N /M. The transformed property P/N /M is checked against the unit automaton 1. In this process, P/N can be understood as a certificate for M, because, if M satisfies P/N , then M N must satisfy P. A certificate generated in this way is not guaranteed to be a homomorphic abstraction of M, however. In fact, the computation of P/N is completely independent of M.
A prominent approach to the compositional model checking of untimed systems is by learning certificates as deterministic word automata [8, 4, 1] . Here, a preliminary certificate C (initially, an automaton accepting the full language) is evaluated against both N and P by model checking. As long as either C rejects some computation of N or M C accepts a computation that violates P, C is refined to eliminate the particular counterexample. This approach has been successful for discrete systems (cf. the LTSA tool [8] ). Since no similar learning algorithms are known for timed languages, however, an immediate extension to real-time systems appears impossible.
As a preparatory step to the work presented in this paper, we investigated quotient-based certificates in the discrete setting of the SPIN model checker [14] . Given two Promela processes M, N and a property automaton P, our tool RESY [13, 12] performs a graphtheoretic analysis of the product of N and P to identify states in M that can safely be merged. For timed systems, a graph-theoretical analysis alone is, of course, not sound, because one location may be safe and another unsafe, even if both have a (discrete) path to an error location.
Contribution. In this paper, we present a general theory and algorithms for the synthesis of certificates in networks of timed automata. The contributions of the paper are the following.
• We define novel equivalence relations for timed automata, which are coarser than simulation but still sound for compositional model checking.
• Based on the new equivalence relations, we present an algorithm for the automatic synthesis of certificates.
• We present an incremental approach for the synthesis of certificates, which can be interrupted at any time to produce a sound intermediate certificate.
Preliminaries
Timed Automata.
is a transition relation, χ is a finite set of real valued clocks, and F ⊆ L is a set of final locations.
The clock constraints ϕ ∈ C(χ) are of the form
where x is a clock in χ and c is a constant in N 0 . A clock valuation t : χ → R ≥0 assigns a non-negative value to each clock and can also be represented by a |χ|-dimensional vector t ∈ R χ ≥0 . We use R = 2 R χ ≥0 to denote the set of all clock valuations.
The states of a timed automaton are pairs (l, t) of locations and clock valuations. Timed automata have two types of transitions: timed transitions, where only time passes and the location remains unchanged, and discrete transitions ∆. A timed transition, denoted by (l, t) a − → (l, t + a · 1), consists of adding the same non-negative value a ∈ R ≥0 to all clocks. A discrete transition, denoted (l, t)
′ of ∆ such that t satisfies the clock constraint ϕ of δ, and t ′ = t[λ := 0] is obtained from t by setting the clocks in λ to 0.
We distinguish system automata, which only have final locations, from property automata, where the set of final locations forms a proper subset of the locations. We assume that, in a property automaton, the sets of initial and final locations are disjoint.
We say that a finite sequence a 1 . . . a n ∈ (Σ ∪ R ≥0 ) * of transitions is in the language of A (a 1 . . . a n ∈ L(A)) if there is a path s 0
the single s i = (l i , t i ) are states of the automaton, s 0 is an initial state (that is, l 0 ∈ I is an initial location and t 0 = 0 is the zero vector), and s i−1 ai − → s i are transitions of A. We write s 0 −→ * s n for the existence of a finite sequence a 1 . . . a n ∈ (Σ ∪ R ≥0 ) * of transitions
an − − → s n , and call a finite automaton safe if no final state is reachable from an initial state (∄i ∈ I, f ∈ F, t ∈ R. (i, 0) −→ * (f, t)).
Composition.
Timed automata can be composed to networks, in which the automata run in parallel and synchronize on shared actions. For two timed automata
, where ∆ is the smallest set that contains
For the ease of argumentation, we assume that all timed automata within a network have the same set Σ of actions. Technically, we can complete a timed automaton by adding a transition l, a, true, ∅, l for every additional symbol a and every location l of the timed automaton without changing the network semantics. This completion implies that (s
is safe if there is no path on which a final state is reachable in A 1 and A 2 at the same time.
Finite Representation. The decidability of timed automata relies on the possibility to symbolically represent the unbounded semantics in the finite region graph [3] , which in turn can be represented efficiently by federations of clock zones [6] .
For a timed automaton A = (L, I, Σ, ∆, χ, F ), we call the value of a clock x ∈ χ maximal if it is strictly greater than the highest constant c max any clock is compared to. (c max is sometimes called the clock ceiling.) We say that two clock valuations t 1 , t 2 : χ → R ≥0 are in the same clock region, denoted t 1 ∼ R t 2 , if
• the set of clocks with maximal value is the same in t 1 and in t 2 (∀x ∈ χ. t 1 (x) > c max ⇔ t 2 (x) > c max ), and
• t 1 and t 2 agree (1) on the integer parts of the clock values, (2) on the relative order of the non-integer parts of the clock values, and (3) on the equality of the non-integer parts of the clock values with 0.
That is, for all clocks x, y with non-maximal value, it holds that (1)
, and (3) t 1 (x) = 0 if, and only if, t 2 (x) = 0, where
We denote with [ t] R = { t ′ ∈ R | t ∼ R t ′ } the clock region t belongs to. We say that two states s 1 = (l 1 , t 1 ) and s 2 = (l 2 , t 2 ) of A are region-equivalent, denoted by s 1 ∼ R s 2 , if their locations are the same (l 1 = l 2 ) and the clock valuations are in the same clock region ( t 1 ∼ R t 2 ), and denote with [(l, 
is the set of equivalence classes of regionequivalent states of A, with
• the classes I ′ = (I × { 0})/ ∼R of states that are region-equivalent to initial states of A as initial states,
′ } of transitions, and 
Proof: For every finite path s 0
Conversely, we show by induction on the length of the path that, for every path in sem(A) from (l, t) R to (l ′ , t ′ ) R , A has a path from (l, t) to a state
(1) If this concrete transition is discrete (a ∈ Σ) than it refers to some transition δ = l, a, ϕ, λ, l ′ . δ can be taken from all representatives (l, t 1 ) ∼ R s 1 of [s 1 ] R because the validity of ϕ is independent of the representative. Taking δ from two representatives (l, t 1 ), (l, t
2 ) with the same location and t 2 = t 1 [λ := 0] and t
2 ) holds true. (2) If this concrete transition is timed (a ∈ R ≥0 ), it suffices to show that t 1 ∼ R t ′ 1 and t 2 = t 1 + a · 1 implies the existence of an a ′ ∈ R ≥0 such that t
. This is obviously true: If one of the non-maximal clocks, say x, has an integer value in t 2 , we have to choose a ′ = t 2 (x) − t ′ 1 (x). Otherwise we pick a nonmaximal clock x with a minimal fractional part f and set a ′ = t 2 (x) − f − t 
The Certificate Synthesis Problem
We now give a formal definition for the problem of synthesizing certificates in networks of timed automata. Let M be a timed automaton in a network M N . We call the timed automaton N the environment of M. Typically, N is the parallel composition of several system automata and some property automaton that defines the safety-critical properties of the complete network.
A timed automaton C is a certificate for M in M N if C is a sound homomorphic abstraction of M. Sound homomorphic abstractions are defined as follows:
′ is the quotient of M with respect to ≃. For a given equivalence relation ≃, the quotient M/ ≃ is defined as the timed
• A timed automaton M ′ is a sound abstraction of a timed automaton M in a network M N , if it holds that M N is safe if and only if M ′ N is safe.
In general, a timed automaton M may have multiple certificates; in particular, M itself is always a certificate, where the equivalence ≃ is simply the identity relation on the locations. Computing the minimal certificate is possible in theory (for example, by enumerating all certificates) but too expensive in practice: 
Proof:
Safety of M N can be checked in linear time in the number of locations; the problem is therefore in NP. We show NP-hardness with a reduction from graph k-colorability. An undirected graph G = (V, E) is k-colorable if there is a function f : V → {1, 2, . . . , k} such that f (u) = f (v) whenever there is an edge {u, v} ∈ E. Let V = {v 1 , . . . , v n }. To decide k-colorability of G, we consider the following pair of timed automata M, N . The automaton M = (V, V, E, ∆ M , ∅, V ) has one location for each vertex in V . The actions consist of the edges in E. For each action {v i , v j } we add a transition from location v i to location v j if i < j:
reaches the final location s F only on paths with exactly two discrete transitions that have the same action. We add a transition from the initial location on input e to location e, and from location e on input e to the final location s F : ∆ E = {(s 0 , e, true, ∅, e) | e ∈ E} ∪ {e, e, true, ∅, s F ) | e ∈ E}.
On the one hand, every certificate C for M in M N , whose equivalence ≃ has k equivalence classes, defines a k-coloring f of G:
there were a pair of vertices v i , v j with {v i , v j } ∈ E and v i ≃ v j , then C N would have an error path on {v i , v j }, {v i , v j }, whereas M N does not have any error paths. On the other hand, if G is k-colorable, then the quotient of M with respect to ≃ is a certificate, because C N , like M N , has no error paths: on every path in C N , each e ∈ E occurs at most once.
In the following sections we present equivalence relations that, while inexpensive to compute, define small certificates.
Forward and Backward Equivalences
In this section, we define the forward equivalence ≃ F and the backward equivalence ≃ B over the locations of a timed automaton M in a network M N . Intuitively, two locations of M are forward-equivalent, if merging them does not make additional states reachable in sem(M N ), and backward-equivalent, if merging them does not make final states reachable from additional states in sem(M N ).
Let L M and L N be the locations of M and N , respectively, and let
Both equivalences define certificates. 
To prove the "only if " direction for forward equivalence, we first observe that the reachability of (m, n, For the induction step
is reachable in sem(M N ), and, using the previous observation, we can conclude that all representatives of ([
The "only if " direction for backward equivalence can be demonstrated analogously.
The computation of the set of reachable states is a standard fixed point construction.
Let (S, I, Σ, ∆, X, F ) = sem(M N ) be the finite semantics of the composition of M and N .
• Succ(S ′ ) = {s ∈ S | ∃s ′ ∈ S ′ . s ′ → s}, and
that map a set S ′ of states to the states reachable from some state in S ′ and from which some state in S ′ is reachable, respectively, then the set FR of forwardreachable states and the set BR of backward reachable states are obtained by the following fixed point computations: In our implementation, the reachability fixed points are computed using a table that maps each location of M N to a clock federation. Testing the forward or backward equivalence of two locations m 1 and m 2 of M then reduces to checking the equivalence of the entries for (m 1 , n) and (m 2 , n) for all locations n of N .
A certificate based on both the forward and the backward equivalence can be obtained by computing the two equivalences in sequence, for example by first computing a forward and then a backward quotient:
Forward-Backward Reachability
The forward and backward equivalences introduced in the previous section base the equivalence either on forward reachability or on backward reachability, but not on both directions at the same time. This results in unnecessarily large quotients, as the following example illustrates. Figure 3 shows the network M N . Locations b and c of the timed automaton M can safely be merged, because the final location remains unreachable in the network. However, b and c are not forward-equivalent, because they are forward-reachable at different times: location b is reached for x > 3, location c for x > 4 (both in conjunction with location f of N ). Since their backward reachability differs also (x < 1 for b and x < 2 for c), they are not backward-equivalent either.
In this section, we define a coarser equivalence that takes both forward and backward reachability into account. For a timed automaton A with finite semantics sem(A) = (S, I, Σ, ∆, χ, F ), we denote the forward-backward reachable states, that is, the states of sem(A) that are reachable from an initial state, and from which a final state is reachable, with fbr(A) ⊆ S (s ∈ fbr(A) ⇔ ∃i ∈ I. i −→ * s ∧ ∃f ∈ F. s −→ * f ). Note that it is not sound to simply restrict the definitions of forward and backward equivalence to the forward-backward reachable states in M N . Consider a modification of the example from Figure 3 , where the guard on the transition from location a to location b is changed to x > 1. The subsets of the forward-reachable states in b and c that are also backward reachable are both still empty. However, merging b and c is no longer safe, because the quotient would, for example, include the path to the final location that passes the merged location {b, c} at time 1.5. In the following definition we therefore pose a slightly stronger requirement, by considering the forward-backward reachable states of N in isolation, rather than in the combination M N .
With fbr(A) χ ′ we denote the generalization of the regions to additional clocks with unconstrained value, that is, the integer part of the values for the new clocks as well as the relative order of the fractional part between the new and old clocks, among the new clocks, and compared to 0 is unconstrained. (We assume without loss of generality that the clock ceiling c max is the same for all timed automata under consideration.) Let L M and χ M be the locations and clocks, respectively, of M, and let
We call two locations m 1 , m 2 ∈ L M weakly forwardequivalent if m 1 ∼ F m 2 and weakly backward-equivalent if m 1 ∼ B m 2 . Compared to forward and backward equivalence as defined in the previous section, the requirements have been weakened in the sense that we ignore global states whose N part is incompatible with N alone. Ignoring these states is safe: A simple corollary of the theorem is that every equivalence relation ∼ that is finer than ∼ F or ∼ B can be used to obtain a certificate. 
Iterative Construction
A direct construction of the forward and backward reachable states is often too expensive. In this section, we therefore propose an approximative technique that over-and underapproximates these sets based on an over-and underapproximation of the successor operator. Constructing the approximations is cheap, but results in certificates, because the resulting equivalence relation is finer than the corresponding (weak) forward or backward equivalence.
In the second subsection, we show that the approximation can be stepwise refined, converging to the precise forward and backward reachable sets. The refinement steps are inexpensive, and intermediate results can be used to build intermediate certificates.
Approximating Reachability
The approximative reachability analysis is based on an abstraction structure, which we define to be any partition Π of the states S of the finite semantics sem(M N ) = (S, I, Σ, ∆, X, F ) of M N . Intuitively, the state sets in Π constitute blocks in the state space that are either added completely or not at all by the approximative Succ and Pred operators. We obtain two versions of each operator: Succ(P ) computes the union of all state sets P ′ ∈ Π of the partition Π such that some state in P ′ has a predecessor in P ; Succ(P ) computes the union of all state sets P ′ in Π such that all states in P ′ have a predecessor in P . Pred and Pred are defined analogously:
Replacing the precise Succ and Pred operators in the fixed point construction from Section 4, we obtain four state sets: an overapproximation FR and an underapproximation FR of the forward reachable states, and, likewise, an overapproximation BR and an underapproximation BR of the backward reachable states.
Our implementation again computes the four approximated reachability fixed points using a table that maps each location of M N to a clock federation.We can establish the forward/backward equivalence of two locations m 1 and m 2 of M once the entries for the overand underapproximation coincide for the entries for (m 1 , n) and (m 2 , n) for all locations n of N by the same technique as in the precise method described in Section 4. Likewise, we can exclude the forward/backward equivalence of two locations m 1 and m 2 as soon as, for some location n of N , the underapproximation of the set of regions attached to (m 1 , n) is not a subset of the overapproximation of the regions attached to (m 2 , n). We can approximate weak forward and weak backward equivalence by intersecting with fbr(N ) χM as described in Section 5.
Abstraction Refinement
Finer abstraction structures result in coarser equivalence relations and, hence, smaller quotients. We iteratively construct a sequence of successively coarser equivalences by stepwise refining the partition Π i . This results in an ascending chain
of underapproximations and a descending chain Table 1 . Certificate synthesis for Fischer's protocol (FP), the Combination Platform (CP), and the Gear Production Stack (GPS). The table shows the size of the environment automaton (N ), the size of the component automaton (M), the size and reduction factor of the certificate (C, factor), the running time of the direct certificate construction, and the performance of UPPAAL on M N and C N , given as the number of states explored and the running time. All benchmarks were measured on an AMD Opteron processor with 2.6 GHz.
practice, the precise equivalence is usually found much earlier. ) We start with some initial partition Π 0 that separates the final states from all other states. In our implementation, Π 0 partitions the states according to their locations.
In every iteration of the refinement loop, we split Π i with a setP ⊆ S of states, resulting in the new partition
The setP is chosen by the refinement heuristic. A simple strategy that improves the approximation of the forward reachable states is to chooseP = Succ(FR i ). In each new iteration, some results of the previous iteration can be reused. For example, the inclusion After every iteration, the approximation defines an equivalence ≈, which can be used to compute an intermediate certificate C ′ . While ≈ is finer than the precise forward or backward equivalences, it often reduces M significantly already after a few refinement steps. In that case, we can replace M with C ′ , and, if desired, switch between computing the forward and backward equivalence. A reuse of intermediate results is still possible after replacing M with C ′ : we again start with Table 1 shows experimental results with our prototype implementation on Fischer's mutual exclusion protocol (FP 2-5) and two case studies provided by our industrial partners BPS IT-Solutions and META-LEVEL Software AG (CP 2-8 and GPS 2-8). For each benchmark, the table shows the size of the environment automaton and the component automaton, the size and reduction factor of the certificate, the running time of the certificate synthesis, and the performance of the UPPAAL [18] model checker on M N and C N . Combination Platform (CP). The combination platform benchmark, provided by META-LEVEL Software AG, models a platform used in car manufacturing that combines several testing machines with units for cleaning and polishing. The different units work in parallel and synchronize after completing their tasks. The critical property of the combination platform is that the work is completed by a certain deadline. The benchmark is parameterized in the number of sub-controllers included in the model.
Benchmarks and Results
Gear Production Stack (GPS). The gear production stack benchmark, provided by BPS IT-Solutions, models a production machine for gear wheels, which consists of units for casting, hardening, and polishing. The units work sequentially on a single workpiece. Like in the CP benchmark, the property requires that the work is completed by a certain deadline. The benchmark is again parameterized in the number of sub-controllers included in the model.
Comparing the growth of the component M with the growth of the certificate C in our parameterized benchmarks, it is evident that the certificate grows much slower. The difference is most clear-cut in the GPS benchmarks, where the size of M grows exponentially, while the size of C only grows linearly.
The running times for the certificate synthesis shown in Table 1 refer to the direct construction of the certificate. Our implementation approximates the weak equivalence relations defined in Section 5 based on a cheap approximation of the set fbr(N ) that partitions the states according to their locations. Table 2 shows experimental results for the incremental certificate synthesis from Section 6. Our implementation starts with an initial abstraction that partitions the states according to their location. As a result, the first intermediate certificate already shows a significant reduction in the number of locations.
If the incremental algorithm is run until termination, the accumulated running time is, in our experiments, higher than the running time of the direct construction. One reason for this effect may be our simple refinement heuristic (P = Succ(FR i )). Good heuristics for choosing the refinement sets, as well as the initial abstraction and the termination point of the iteration, are interesting topics for future research.
Conclusions
We have presented a solution to the problem of synthesizing a certificate for a timed automaton M in a network M N . In contrast to the NP hardness of finding the minimal certificate, the cost of our construction is just linear in the number of locations; nevertheless, the dramatic decrease in size from the component M to the certificate C in our experimental results suggests that the certificates found by our construction are close to minimal.
Since our approach is based on a reachability construction, the worst-case complexity in terms of the number of clocks is exponential. To address this issue we have proposed an iterative approximation method that can be interrupted at any time to produce a sound certificate.
We believe that the certificates constructed by certifying model checkers will be useful to designers in understanding which component requirements are hard in the sense that they are necessary to guarantee the safety of the system, and which requirements are soft, that is, relevant for the quality provided by the system but not for its safety. Such a classification is an important piece of documentation and useful in future adaptations of the verified design.
